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“let us be more wary of the dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a 
‘pure will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge’, let us be wary of the 
tentacles of such contradictory concepts as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, 
‘knowledge as such’: - here we are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought 
at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretative 
powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a 
seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded. 
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; the more affects 
we allow to speak about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for 
the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our 
‘objectivity’” (Nietzsche 1994: 92, original 1887).
The subject-object distinction, traditionally constitutive of those discourses deemed 
‘scientific’ or ‘academic’, has not ceased to bedevil anthropological practice and 
theorising, even in the wake of the celebration of subjectivism which was post-
modernist ethnography. Anthropological discourse has continued to depend on 
positioning a ‘subject who knows’ as the font of whatever knowledge the 
ethnography disseminates of the objects which are ‘known’. This siting distances 
the observer and his or her audience not only from the human ‘objects’ 
ethnographies present but also, I will argue, from the possibility of understanding 
the processes by which their own cultural activities and interpretations are 
constructed. 
Attempts to overcome the distance between the observer and the communities 
observed by critiquing and undermining the authority of the usually disembodied 
‘voice’ of the anthropological narrator have produced innovative - and ofttimes 
fiercely attacked - programmes both to ‘situate’ the ethnographer more visibly in 
the field he/she offers up to the ethnography’s readers and to ‘give voice’ to those 
living objects which are the matter on which the text focuses (see, for example, the 
pieces collected in Marcus 1992). Such innovations have nonetheless failed to 
prevent (and have arguably contributed to) an even further widening of the 
ontological gap opened by cultural relativism between persons and communities 
studied and those doing the studying. In the late sixties and early seventies, when 
relativism became the hegemonic mode of interpreting cultural difference, the 
‘modernist’ stance of coming to know the other in order to enable his or her 
eventual transformation into something culturally and socially much more akin to 
the self was in large part delegitimated. Ironically this delegitimisation led not to an 
increased appreciation of humankind’s protean diversity but to a reification of 
alterity - notable in the transformation of ‘others’ to ‘the Other’ - which erects what 
seems to be wellnigh impassible boundaries between the spaces occupied by ‘them’ 
and those carefully scribed off as ‘our own’. In the contemporary setting, where the 
inheritors of the West’s enlightenment legacy increasingly portray themselves to 
themselves as ghettoised within a world of potentially hostile alterity, the 
anthropologist is called upon to carry out the apparently heroic task of voyaging 
out and into those alien spaces so as to return ‘home’ with mappings of those alien 
domains.
However, just as the modernist hubris which had supported Western hegemony has 
faltered, so too has the anthropologist’s confidence in being able to translate the 
conceptual space occupied by the ‘objects’ studied into a terminology 
comprehensible to his or her home audience. The two above-mentioned strategies 
- of rendering the encounter with another culture as a more or less 
autobiographical account of one’s responses to alterity and of offering up large 
gobbets of the other’s discourses as the other’s authentic voice - respectively fail to 
give us access to the ways other peoples see the world in which they live or to offer 
us translations of their ways of seeing into languages through which we can share 
those perspectives. The former provides salutary insight into how anthropologists 
ideologically site themselves at home and abroad as well as into their 
interpretations of what responsibilities appear to them to devolve from those 
sitings. The latter offers opaque transcriptions of the terms in which persons of 
other communities represent themselves and their practices in the presence of an 
outsider. Neither offers audiences more than surfaces beyond which the others 
reside. In the former case the surface is that of the ethnographer’s awareness of an 
outside which impinges on his or her self- consciousness and forces a greater 
awareness of his or her own presuppositions and previously unarticulated agendas. 
In the latter the surface is that of a string of signifiers which hides beneath it the 
signifieds which would make it understandable1. 
1
 As Mark Cousins points out in a review of Lévi-Strauss’s Introduction to the 
It is rare for the post-modern anthropologist - having feinted at authorial authority 
- not to slide back into an unreconstructed objectivist voice offering up the 
meanings of what was observed or the translations of what was transcribed. 
Ethnographers from one tendency within post-modern anthropology, having 
repeatedly stressed the barriers thrown up by their ideological and professional 
positionings before any real understanding of cultural others, will proceed to 
provide interpretations of the way ‘the others’ live ‘there’. Those of the other 
tendency, having chastised anthropological tradition for advocating speaking over 
the voice of the other, offer their  readers long transcriptions of ‘native’ speech 
before proceeding to distill out of those texts (which they have transcribed, edited 
and arranged in place in their own texts) the significant elements of what it is ‘the 
others’ have to say about their worlds. 
On my shelves as I write I find only one text, written in the first decade of this 
century, in which the ethnographer offers up, without commentary or 
interpretation, the words of those worked with. Edward Sapir, who was well aware 
of the impossibility of loosing signification from the context of its enunciation, 
provided in his Takelma Texts no more than a bilingual rendering of his 
informants’s words, with one line of text offering a literal phonetic transcription of 
the North American Indian myths and the next a literal word by word translation 
Work of Marcel Mauss, recognizing an act of communication and 
comprehending the significance it carries are two distinct things:  “within 
twentieth-century anthropological commentaries the utterance of some 
Bororo who said to von Steinem, ‘We are red parakeets’, resounds with a 
raging subjective intensity of communication. The most foreign utterance is 
not only still one, it is perhaps pre- eminently the one which communicates 
its subjective force. The problem is how to separate ourselves from it, so 
that we may know it, know what it signifies” (Cousins 1989: 84).
into English of the Takelma words (Sapir 1909). This is, of course, a text of little use 
to anyone but the North American Indian expert who brings to it the interpretative 
knowledge necessary for rendering its matter meaningful. One suspects that even 
surviving Takelmas would find the material collected by Sapir incomprehensible 
without some translation device to close a gap of ninety years of social, cultural and 
political change. 
The encounter with the opacity of Sapir’s Takelma Texts, like those with the double 
play of post-modernist ethnographers who say they cannot speak of or for the 
other and then proceed to do so, suggests that cultural translation is necessary if 
any understanding of other people’s practices and discourses is to be achieved by 
those not habituated to the locales in which those practices and discourses take 
place. Talal Asad argues - in an essay which very much runs against the grain of the 
collection in which it is published (James Clifford and George Marcus’s Writing 
Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography) - that the work of anthropology 
must depend on some form of cultural translation. Translation must, however, be 
carried out with sensitivity to the fact that some sorts of translation fail to offer 
insight into the cultures studied or substantially distort the indigenous meanings of 
practices and articulations. Asad demonstrates the degree to which translating or 
representing entails power, and points to issues of inequality between the language 
of the anthropologist and his or her culture and that of the peoples studied: 
“the interesting question for enquiry is...how power enters into the process of 
‘cultural translation’, seen both as a discursive and non- discursive practice.... 
anthropologists need to explore these processes in order to determine how far they 
go in defining the possibilities and the limits of effective translation” (Asad 1986: 
163 and 164).
He stresses that the academic writing of many anthropologists tends, “by the 
attribution of implicit meanings to an alien practice regardless of whether they are 
acknowledged by its agents,...to create meanings for a subject”  (Asad 1986: 161 
and 162). Such attributions are made not only with little or no regard for whether or 
not the people whose lives are thus rendered ‘meaningful’ would subscribe to - or 
even recognise the pertinence of - that interpretation but also with indifference to 
that question2.  
Sperber notes that such ‘explanatory’ discourses tend to be products not of the 
fieldwork experience but of its subsequent writing up. He contends that 
anthropologists returning from the field erect in their writings barriers of alterity 
and incompatibility between cultural groups which do not seem to have been there 
while the anthropologists were engaged in fieldwork: 
The best evidence against relativism is, ultimately, the very activity of 
anthropologists, while the best evidence for relativism seems to be in the writings 
of anthropologists. How can that be? It seems that, in retracing their steps, 
anthropologists transform into unfathomable gaps the shallow and irregular 
boundaries that they had found not so difficult to cross, thereby protecting their 
own sense of identity, and providing their philosophical and lay audience with just 
2
  Asad contends that Ernest Gellner engages in cultural translation as “a 
matter of determining implicit meanings - not the meanings the native 
speaker actually acknowledges in his speech, not even the meanings the 
native listener necessarily accepts, but those he is ‘potentially capable of 
sharing’ with scientific authority ‘in some ideal situation’....The fact that in 
that ‘ideal situation’ he would no longer be a Berber tribesman but 
something coming to resemble Professor Gellner does not appear to worry 
such cultural translators” (Asad, 1986: 162).
what they want to hear (Sperber 1985: 62-63).
Contemporary anthropologists ‘other’ the people they have studied so as to 
publicize their expertise in penetrating and understanding the alien reaches beyond 
the bounds of their originary cultures and to convince their audiences not only that 
the knowledge of alterity provided is hard-earned and thus ‘real’ but also that it is a 
glimpse of something really ‘other’ and not just another perspective on another 
extension of the everyday.
In the instances of cultural translation critiqued by Asad and Sperber we note what 
seem to be generic ethnographic tendencies to produce anthropological knowledge 
by dismembering the world the anthropologist has come to know through dialogue 
and participant observation in the field so that it can be reconstituted in the text to 
accord with analytical categories foreign to those whose world is there re-
presented. Such intellectual analysis engages in the same process of subordinating 
event to classificatory principle as does the early modernist eighteenth century 
natural history Mary Louise Pratt describes: 
“natural history’s naming is...directly transformative. It extracts all the things of the 
world and redeploys them into a new knowledge formation whose value lies 
precisely in its difference from the chaotic original....the naming brings the reality 
of order into being” (Pratt 1992: 33). 
The implication, explicit since Descartes’s work on the constitutive relationship of 
cogito to being, is that phenomena are in themselves effectively ‘untrue’ until the 
reason of the (Western) intellectual has - through abstraction, induction and re-
assemblage - reworked them so that they appear as manifestations of a-temporal 
laws or categories. A purely phenomenalistic account of an anthropologist’s 
experience of a community could only, by this rule, be either a journal (i.e., a non-
academic memoir) or the raw material of an ethnography in waiting; it would only 
be a contribution to knowledge after after its data was transformatively reworked. 
The division of the world into two distinct but interacting fields - the one a 
disordered mass of phenomena emersed in contingency and the other a regimented 
body of a-temporal laws standing over and against that chaos - is the founding 
move of what the West came to define as modernity (Bowman 1996). Modernity 
constitutes the world (including the unenlightened masses and persons of non-
modern cultures) as a disordered material to be made over by its technologies in 
accordance with images of its potential realization discerned by the rational 
thought of an intelligentsia. The intellectual is located ‘outside’ the world in the 
‘ivory tower’ of academia  (a site the modernist professionalisation of intellectual 
cogitation institutionalizes) from whence the world can be gazed upon and 
legislated for without endangering the intellectual with implication in its inherent 
confusion. Bruno Latour, in We Have Never Been Modern, describes the process 
which underlies the mythology of ‘modern’ natural and social sciences as a 
‘purification’ dividing the world into two essentially disjunct realms of being - those 
of nature and of culture3. Through this process of purification ‘natural’ entities and 
events are discursively constructed as operating solely in accord with the laws of 
nature while ‘cultural’ beings and artifacts are shown as the undiluted productions 
3
 Latour, as an historian of science, locates the advent of modernity in the 
early seventeenth century with the empiricist move to separate the domains 
of ideology and nature. In my above-mentioned paper I argued that the 
advent of modernity - as a movement to impose a universal ‘truth order’ on 
the matter of the world - can be located much earlier with the fourth century 
imperial legitimation of the missionary project of Christianity (Bowman 1996: 
110-113).
of human passion, will, ignorance and intellect. Between and outside the territories 
of these two purified fields of knowledge rests phenomenal reality - a domain 
marked by contingency, mutation and hybridity. Over all of these disjuncted tracts 
ranges the disembodied gaze of the intellectual.
Latour deconstructs this foundational mythology by demonstrating that this radical 
disjunction is not elemental but is the culmination of a process whereby initially 
unitary phenomena (events resident in the space he calls that of ‘natures-cultures’4) 
are defined as intermediary ‘mixtures’ of Nature and Culture which are then 
distilled to abstract from solution the pure forms of the Natural and the Cultural. 
‘Hybrid’ knowledges, produced through the creative admixture of things and 
practices, are ‘purified’ by radically separating those ‘objects’ from the historical, 
political and ideological processes which made them meaningful in the first place. 
Latour instances Boyle’s ‘discovery’ of his law concerning vacuums. Boyle and his 
assistants,  through an elaborate set of experiments involving technological 
inventions such as the vacuum pump, created the phenomenon from whence Boyle 
subsequently derived the law he then claimed to have ‘discovered’: 
 “Boyle and his descendants are not simply saying that the Laws of Nature escape 
4
 “the very notion of culture is an artifact created by bracketing nature off. 
Cultures - different or universal - do not exist, any more than Nature does. 
There are only natures-cultures....similar in that they simultaneously 
construct humans, divinities and nonhumans. None of them inhabits a world 
of signs or symbols arbitrarily imposed on an external Nature known to us 
alone. None of them - and especially not our own - lives in a world of 
things. All of them sort out what will bear signs and what will not. If there is 
one thing we all do, it is surely that we construct both our human collectives 
and the nonhumans that surround them” (Latour 1993: 104 and 106).
our grasp; they are also fabricating these laws in the laboratory. Despite their 
artificial construction inside the vacuum pump (such is the phase of mediation or 
translation), the facts completely escape all human fabrication (such is the phase of 
purification)” (Latour 1993: 33).
Out of this discursive fabrication of “two entirely distinct ontological zones; that of 
human beings on the one hand; that of nonhumans on the other” (Latour 1993: 10), 
we who deem ourselves modern have come to two world historical conclusions. The 
first is that there is a ‘great divide’ between our own scientific culture - which 
knows and mobilizes nature - and all those other cultures which unwittingly 
compound the laws of nature and the processes of culture and hence know neither 
themselves nor the world they live in. The second is that an objective knowledge of 
the world is possible for those who are modern, and that this knowledge is 
grounded on a radical distinction between a ‘subject/society’ which knows the 
world of objects and the world as such. One of the implications of these two 
conclusions is that other cultures, and the people who make them up, are 
objectified so that they can be studied and known by the intelligentsia of our own 
culture. The other implication, ironically, is that we who can know others cannot 
know ourselves since the laboratory of life, in which we create/discover the laws 
determining the being of objects and those regulating the activities of subjects, is a 
place which must be disregarded and excluded to protect the axioms which enable 
our forms of knowledge.
Although Latour’s main field of analysis is that of the natural sciences, the 
implications of his studies are powerful for the social sciences and for anthropology 
in particular5. The ‘field’ is analogous to Latour’s laboratory in being the place 
5
 Interestingly, We Have Never Been Modern is marked by a profound 
where anthropologists bring their presuppositions and experiences into relation 
with ethnological material provided by the speech and activities of the peoples they 
study. The interrelation of anthropologist and those who speak and reveal the raw 
materials of ethnographies produces new knowledges which are neither purely 
those of the anthropologists’s own cultures nor those of the cultures they observe. 
Paul Rabinow, in his Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco describes the mutual 
understanding labouriously worked out between anthropologist and informant as “a 
hybrid, cross-cultural object or product” (Rabinow 1977: 152) and characterises 
“fieldwork...[as] a process of intersubjective construction of liminal modes of 
communication.” (Rabinow 1977: 155). Neither the fieldworker nor the informant 
emerge from this process as the same person he or she was before entering into it; 
the process Rabinow describes (Rabinow 1977: 152) of objectifying elements of the 
everyday so that they can be communicated to the ethnographer, like the procedure 
ambivalence towards anthropology. Latour opens by posing anthropology as 
a totalising model fit to deconstruct the mythological divisions of the fields 
of ‘modern’ society (“in works produced by anthropologists abroad, you will 
not find a single trait that is not simultaneously real, social and 
narrated” [Latour 1993: 7]) but concludes by asserting that  “[a]nthropology 
had been built on the basis of science, or on the basis of society, or on the 
basis of language; it always alternated between universalism and cultural 
relativism, and in the end it may have taught us as little about ‘Them’ as 
about ‘Us’” (Latour 1993: 129). The clue to his ambivalence may lie in his 
assertion that “it is possible to do an anthropological analysis of the modern 
world - but then the very definition of the modern world has to be 
altered” (Latour 1993: 7); an anthropology which draws its analytical 
categories from the ‘modern’ cannot - because of the epistemology which 
underwrites those categories - do more than reiterate the illusions which 
constitute modern society’s understanding of itself. 
Cousins relates (see note one, above) of separating ourselves from something so 
that we can comprehend its significance, creates not only new knowledge but also 
new knowers. This defamiliarization effects informants, who refigure their 
relationship to their world in offering its parameters up to the ethnographer, as well 
as anthropologists who, taking up residence in new domains, rework their 
assumptions about self and its habitus. Thus Rabinow, writing of returning ‘home’ 
to New York from Morocco, relates that he was no more at home there than he had 
been in the field: “the maze of slightly blurred nuance, that feeling of barely 
grasped meanings which had been my constant companion in Morocco overtook me 
once again. But now I was home” (Rabinow 1977: 148). 
This problematisation of identity rarely if ever appears in subsequent ethnographies 
where the voice of the ethnographer fades out and is replaced by that of the 
disembodied observer. Just as these texts render invisible or relegate to a brief 
mention in the foreword the hard collective labour of working out a series of 
metaphors for translating the objects of everyday life from the minds of native 
observers into that of an initially naïve visitor, so too do the texts replace the 
confused and ofttimes querulous speech of the anthropologist in the field with a 
cool and disembodied ‘truth voice’. As Favret-Saada points out, 
“ethnography as I learnt it - and even taught it - is considered a science so long as 
one covers up the traces of what fieldwork was like....A noteworthy feature of the 
ethnographic text is that the stating subject (or rather, the author) is regularly 
hidden. He withdraws in favour of what he states about his subject” (Favret-Saada 
1980: 26).
In this process of ‘purification’, whereby a nebulous mass of impressions and 
approximations is shaped into a prison house of rules said to contain the culture 
discussed, the anthropologist also shape-shifts. The unheimlich processes of 
disorientation and loss which characterise the anthropologist’s field experiences are 
generally excised from the ethnography. If they are mentioned it is to set them out 
as moments - analogous to those which anthropologists relate when discussing the 
transformation of afflicted persons into healers capable of curing the afflictions of 
others - in a process whereby the ‘one who knows’ is initiated into a position 
endowing him or her with the power to know even more. The, usually muted, 
‘mystical’ character of this enhancement is wonderfully expressed by Merleau-Ponty 
in a piece discussing the anthropologist’s development: 
“He has only to have learned at some time and at sufficient length to let himself be 
taught by another culture. For from then on he has a new organ of understanding at 
his disposal - he has regained possession of that untamed region of himself, 
unincorporated in his own culture, through which he communicates with other 
cultures” (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 120).
In Merleau-Ponty’s portrait of the anthropologist we see the ethnographer shedding 
the lineaments of contingency and historicity Rabinow so carefully sketched in so as 
to reveal ‘himself’ - for the Apollonian form is always masculine - as the bearer of 
the cool and all- encompassing gaze of objective (read ‘absolute’) knowledge.
As I have argued above, we cannot avoid this modernist deification of the 
anthropologist by simply expanding our autobiographical forewords into full-blown 
subjectivist ethnographies (which are not the same as ethnographies of the self) or 
appending to our objectivist texts long allegedly legitimising extracts of ‘native 
speech’. These ploys, in different ways, serve in the final instance to keep the 
subjects of our inquiries at a distance. Furthermore, whereas the latter strategy falls 
back into anthropological objectivism as soon as the necessity to ‘speak for’ the 
indigenous texts is acted upon, with the former strategy - in those cases where the 
commitment to placing the self is adhered to rigorously - the anthropological 
imperative of striving to understand those of other cultures is displaced by the 
quest to understand the self. Ironically, however, ethnographers attempting to 
escape objectivism’s imperialist mandate by abandoning the other and seeking the 
self often produce little more than academic reification of the common sense 
categories which underwrite their own cultures6.
The initial move towards a solution lies, I suggest, neither in redefining the nature 
of the anthropological ‘object’ nor in reworking field methods but in rejecting as 
untenable the ‘pure will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge’  (Nietzsche 
1994: 92) through whose mask we speak the conclusions our researches are 
alleged to have generated. Such an unmasking entails, however, far more than a 
rhetorical substitution of the proscribed first person for the third person voice of 
classical ethnography. It involves discarding the ‘one’ which voices ‘knowledge as 
such’ and substituting for it the ‘I’ of the ethnographer who speakes as one who 
has discarded the certitudes of a previous identity and put in their place the 
provisional hypotheses of a self constituted through dialogue with persons and 
places organised according to ‘alien’ assumptions. Such a substitution, in effect, 
changes everything. 
This move dissolves the community constructed by rhetorical conventions between 
the subject who knows and the subjects addressed by ethnographic discourse. No 
longer does the ethnographic voice speak an authoritative knowledge to an 
6
 It is indicative of what Latour calls anthropology’s failure to have taught us 
any more about ourselves than about others that reflexive anthropology’s 
inability to escape the subject positions of western autobiography is 
mirrored by mainstream anthropology’s continued enmirement in the 
ideological category of the self as the locus of anthropological inquiry - a 
position recently celebrated in the work of Anthony Cohen (Cohen 1994). 
audience presumed capable of unproblematically assimilating that knowledge7. 
Instead the ethnographer, speaking from a site dislodged by fieldwork experience 
from the domain of shared assumptions that constitutes the common sense of his 
originary community, attempts to communicate with a ‘home audience’ by 
constructing a network of descriptions and models capable of engaging his or her 
audience in a work of interpretation and conceptual distortion like that the 
ethnographer went through in making sense of fieldwork experience. In other 
words, the ethnographic text, rather than inviting its readers to join its author on 
the Olympian heights of objective knowledge from whence they all can look down 
knowingly upon the anthropological objects (who - being outside modernity - are 
themselves incapable of occupying that vantage point of self- comprehension), calls 
upon its readers to enter through dialogue into community with a cultural 
expatriate. Out of this dialogue may emerge a shared sense of what it is for them to 
occupy a space other than that which surrounds their everyday lives. 
The reader’s imaginative occupation of the space of shared understandings which 
the fieldworker and his or her informants constructed is not, I would insist, a 
complete transposition of the reader into the fieldworker’s experience of being on 
the edge of two cultural domains. Just as the ethnographer comes to inhabit not the 
life world of those he or she studies but a place which is a dialogically-constructed 
7
 “[I]n ethnographic writings neither the speaker nor his partner - in other 
words, neither the stating subject, author of the scientific report, nor his 
reader - are defined. It is implied that the ‘I’ need not introduce himself 
because he is taken for granted, just like the ‘you’ who is talked to. It is so 
much a matter of course that the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ converse about ‘him’, that 
the stating subject can withdraw behind an indefinite subject, and call 
himself ‘one’” (Favret-Saada 1980: 27).
approximation of that world strongly inscribed by elements of the culture in which 
he or she was raised and trained8, so too the people who make up the 
ethnographer’s audience construct images of the anthropologists’s liminal habitus 
which are hybrid meldings of aspects of the ethnographer’s representations with 
experiences and expectations particular to those readers.
That hybridization of everyday assumptions with matter taken from worlds 
organised according to different assumptions provides the audience of the 
ethnographies I am proposing with the experience Victor Shklovskij of the Russian 
Formalist movement claimed emerged from engagement with good literary art. At 
the core of such poetry and prose Shklovskij located the poetic device of ostranenie 
(‘making strange’) which functions, in the words of Victor Erlich, in the following 
manner: 
 “Rather than translating the unfamiliar into the terms of the familiar, the poetic 
image ‘makes strange’ the habitual by presenting it in a novel light, by placing it in 
an unexpected context....By tearing the object out of its habitual context, by 
bringing together disparate notions, the poet gives a coup de grâce to the verbal 
cliché and to the stock responses attendant upon it and forces us into heightened 
awareness of things and their sensory texture. The act of creative deformation 
restores sharpness to our perception, giving ‘density’ to the world around 
us” (Erlich 1955: 150)9.
8
 As Rabinow points out, the informant, in developing a vocabulary through 
which he or she can communicate with the fieldworker, is also displaced 
from the life world he or she occupied prior to the necessity of 
communicating that world to the anthropologist (Rabinow, 1977: 152 and 
162f on Driss ben Mohammed).
9
Although the ethnographic reader’s experience of imaginatively occupying the 
space which the anthropologist was brought to inhabit by field research is bound to 
be less powerful than the anthropologist’s own experience insofar as the reader’s is 
vicarious, reading ethnographies should nonetheless serve to involve the reader in 
the same denaturalization of previous cultural assumptions as the fieldworker 
experienced in bringing himself or herself to understand that life can be lived 
according to different rules. While traditional ethnography works to provide abstract 
decodifications of those rules, and thus both to offer them up in familiar terms and 
to disengage them from the worlds where the practices of everyday life make them 
manifest, a more direct rendering of the anthropologist’s experience of living with 
those rules will serve to show them as reality-producing rather than as ideological 
errors which distort the real. The vicarious experience of ‘going through’ a terrain 
thus differently organized may induce the reader, in turning his or her gaze back to 
the rules which organize the space of his or her quotidian life, to perceive them (at 
least until the expatriating effect wears off) as yet another set of culturally-
constructed models for world building10.  
  My insistence, throughout this text, on using the clumsy pronominal ‘he or 
she’ and ‘his or her’ instead of the more familiar ‘he’ or ‘his’ is itself an 
intentional mobilization of ostranenie meant to force the reader to reflect on 
the cultural practice of eliding the feminine when producing a ‘universal’ 
subject position which is in fact masculine. 
10
 What comes to mind as I attempt to formulate how ostranenie might 
function in reading ethnography is my own experience, twenty years ago, of 
feeling an extended sense of cognitive dissonance on finishing Larry Niven’s 
science fiction novel Ring World (Niven 1972) as I ‘slid back’ from a reality in 
which lives I had imaginatively participated in were lived on great terra- 
Shifting ethnography’s focus so that it expresses a process of familiarization with 
other cultural domains rather than relaying a decoding of materials abstracted from 
the fieldwork experience removes the ‘unfathomable gaps’ Sperber describes as 
separating the readers of ethnographies from the peoples portrayed in them. Once 
the artificial ‘othering’ Sperber sees as written into the ethnographic text is excised, 
readers can vicariously experience crossing ‘the shallow and irregular boundaries’ 
the anthropologist traversed in coming to reside within the habitus of the people he 
or she studied. As a result, readers will encounter those others with whom the 
ethnographer enters into dialogue no longer as depersonalised types 
demonstrating the radical alterity of ‘the Other’ but - as do the readers of 
Rabinow’s Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco or Favret-Saada’s Deadly Words - as 
persons who, like the fieldworker his or her self, struggle to produce meaningful 
statements and acts in a world scored with contingency and potential 
incomprehension. 
One effect of this is a redesignation of the ‘objects’ of ethnography as ‘subjects’ 
who, rather than being displayed as depersonalized representations of either their 
culture or of factions within that culture, are introduced as individuals attempting to 
make themselves understood to the anthropologist at particular moments and in 
particular contexts. This particularization undermines anthropology’s typical 
objectification of the other’s ‘culture’ and instead shows that culture is only 
manifest in expression (whether this expression be an individual utterance or the 
collective erection of temple complexes) and is constantly varied and reworked as 
different contexts place different demands upon its enunciators (and, in the case of 
the artifacts of material culture, interpreters). There are radical implications to 
formed hoops circling their sun to one in which people lived on orbiting 
ovoid rock formations.
redefining culture so that it is no longer represented as an entity which all its 
subjects’s enunciations express but as a mutable vocabulary emerging into 
consciousness through subjects’s expressions. If culture is a mode of expression 
rather than an entity - a language rather than a matrix - then ethnography does not 
analyse ‘Culture’ per se (which may, by this argument, be non-existent) but 
analyses a set of enunciations which can be grouped as expressive of a particular 
mode of meaning- making engaged in by a greater or lesser number of persons. In 
Favret-Saada’s examination of what people say and do when discerning and 
countering the attacks of witches it is clear that she is working with small groups of 
persons whose discursive constructions of the realities they inhabit isolate them - 
in their self perceptions as well as in those of other communities they live with in 
the Bocage - from others around them. Similarly, in works such as Griaule’s 
Conversations with Ogotemmêle (Griaule 1965) in which the reader observes the 
dialogic elaboration of a cosmology through the conversations of fieldworker and 
informant, one recognises that - despite the ethnographer’s assertion that what is 
being ‘revealed’ is the authentic terrain of the culture studied - a world is here 
constructed which exists for the ethnographer, the informant and - perhaps - the 
reader of the text. In both cases the representations being relayed are those 
constituted by informants and ethnographer through a developing mutual 
understanding rather than - as the rhetoric of conventional ethnography (which 
Favret-Saada rejects and to which Griaule adheres) implies - those of a culture 
whose tenets the anthropologist has been able, with objective detachment, to 
discern, observe and transcribe.
Discourse makes a world which is no less real because it is occupied only by those 
who construct it through the process of sharing agreement on its elements.  As 
Rabinow demonstrates with the example of how his queries about a local saint - 
Sidi Lachen Lyussi - impelled the community he worked within to ‘discover’ a 
history for a figure they’d previously known only as a revered name (Rabinow 1977: 
131-133)11, a discursively constructed reality can ‘grow’ as more and more people 
come to accept the world it bodies forth.  The more people who come to adhere to 
it, however, the more ‘play’ there is in defining its terms and the rules of the 
‘language games’ it calls into being. Witchcraft, like the Dogon rules of smithy-
building or the legends of Sidi Lachen Lyussi, comes into being for persons when 
they accept that the term designates a reality, but different groups - and different 
individuals - may represent that reality to themselves and to others in quite 
disparate ways. Collective acceptance of a reality- designating term can constitute a 
community around the belief that that term designates a reality, but that 
community is continuously threatened with dissolution by interpretative conflicts 
over what that thing is and what dictates it imposes on those who believe in it12. As 
Slavoj Žižek points out, “the consistency of our language, of our field of meaning, 
on which we rely in our everyday life, is always a precarious, contingent bricolage 
that can, at any given moment, explode into a lawless series of singularities” (Žižek 
1991: 153-154). Ethnographers, who gain their knowledge of other communities’s 
11
 Rabinow’s observations here lead one to query whether anthropologists’s 
rôle in enabling peoples to ‘rediscover’ their traditions may in fact be that of 
facilitating what Hobsbawm and Ranger have called ‘the invention of 
tradition’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983).
12
  In “A Country of Words” I have discussed the way the term ‘Palestine’ 
constitutes a transnational community which tends to disintegrate when its 
constituencies articulate different perceptions about what being ‘Palestinian’ 
means and demands (Bowman 1994).
ways of life through discussions with and observations of a small number of 
informants, must build their interpretations of the life-worlds of those communities 
on the foundations of acquaintance with a limited number of readings and 
enactments of ‘the real’. If it can be acknowledged that the realities represented are 
in fact a network of singularities emerging from the contexts of field research, the 
essentialist - and othering - concept of Culture can be jettisoned and with it the 
‘unfathomable gaps’ dividing the people of the anthropologist’s originary 
community from those of the collectivities studied. 
We appear to challenge the continuing existence of anthropology as a field of 
inquiry by proposing to dissolve the category of culture into a bricolage of 
utterances held together by speakers’s assumptions that they are talking about the 
same things. Once the category of culture is delegitimated, so too, it seems, is 
anthropology’s remit as a discipline examining human cultures. What is left, 
however, once that definitional shift has been effected by the loss of the 
generalising authority of ‘the subject who knows’,  is what always was at the core of 
field-based anthropological endeavour - the study of human beings making of the 
world a setting in which they can live meaningful lives. Whether the ethnographer’s 
field of inquiry be the connections between constructed environments and 
persons’s understandings of their organising principles or the attempts of 
individuals afflicted by misfortune to discern the agencies behind those afflictions, 
anthropological inquiries have - at the moments in which their data are collected - 
inevitably focussed on the interpretational processes through which persons thrown 
into being in the world seek to render controllable and coherent the contingencies 
and uncertainties of that world. David Pocock wrote in 1971 that, “if it is to 
develop”, social anthropology must constitute as the object of its study  “the play of 
society maintaining itself against, modifying itself to meet, the steady flow of new 
individuals - whether people or events” (Pocock 1971: 112- 113). I would contend 
that this has, despite anthropology’s own varied self-definitions, been the object of 
anthropological study since the time when anthropological practice determined that 
fieldwork would be the primary source of anthropological data. Where the 
perspective Pocock demands in his call for an anthropology “which enables us to 
conceive of society in duration” (Pocock 1971: 112) is occluded is not in 
ethnographers’s approaches in the field to the objects of their studies (after all, 
informants - like all human beings - are always caught up in the labour of 
maintaining their assumptions against, modifying them to meet, the steady flow of 
new experiences) but in the way subsequent reworkings of what informants tell 
them abstract sets of atemporal and generalized codes and laws out of the 
interpretational processes informants revealed. The ‘culture’ which emerges from 
those abstractions not only freezes the social flux into an allegedly enduring 
moment (see Fabian 1983) but also illicitly concatenates a series of statements, 
made by different persons in different contexts, into the univocal voice of an entire 
collectivity. 
If that abstractive reworking is abandoned and the anthropologist records all 
aspects of the processes of manifesting significant acts or statements13, what will 
become evident to ethnographic readers is what was as well evident to the 
ethnographer before he or she subsumed it in interpretative abstraction - the way 
in which persons ‘read’ situations and contexts with reference to memories of 
previous encounters with similar events (and in terms of their memories of other 
person’s narratives of analogous encounters), assess the ways contemporary 
13
 Favret-Saada notes that “I made it a rule to write...about the native 
discourse including silences, slips of the tongue, repetitions, hesitations and 
so on” (Favret-Saada, 1980: 150, note 2).
encounters conform with or diverge from those previous situations, and enact or 
adapt previous responses to situations faced. In some situations the process of 
evaluation and response seems to take place without hesitation whereas in others it 
can be long, arduous and productive of anxiety. The eventual response - whether it 
be a statement, a gesture, or an activity - is a reply to the query (‘how do you 
respond to this?’) thrown up by an event. While an abstractive anthropology would 
disregard the process of assessment and reify the eventual reply as an expression 
of ‘culture’ (thus effacing other replies), an anthropology not committed to the 
quest for culture per se would seek to perceive regularities and differences in the 
ways persons, at different times and in different places, reply to what they 
encounter as they move through their lives. Such replies need not be - and most 
often are not - explicit statements of comprehension or intent; articulations, as 
Bourdieu has shown in The Logic of Practice, are also choreographed activities 
expressing that “immediate but unselfconscious understanding which defines the 
practical relationship [of the actor] to the world” (Bourdieu 1990: 18). The 
ethnographer then must attend to and record not only what people say about their 
relationships with their contexts but also how they position themselves and act in 
response to the situations in which they find themselves. 
Such attention to the various responses of individuals to situations is not - despite 
appearances - founded on the assumption, rejected in note six above, that the self 
is the locus of anthropological inquiry. In what follows I will argue that the ‘self’ is a 
dynamic internalization of a series of subject positions and repertoires offered it, 
through its development in social contexts, by others. At this point I would, 
however, stress simply that anthropologists must attend closely to the instances in 
which so-called cultural representations are produced since the traditional 
alternative - abstracting culture out of the contexts in which it is articulated - can 
only distance the ethnographer and his or her audience from processes whereby 
previous experiences and knowledges are mobilized and/or adapted to meet the 
demands which encounters with new events or new individuals impose. The 
attention I propose paying to particulars does not, however, trap me in a world 
which can only be represented as a congery of singularities; as Favret-Saada shows 
in the concluding section of Deadly Words, it is possible to deduce out of a field of 
enunciations a ‘logic’ or grammar underlying the diversity of particular statements. 
Such deduction is licit insofar as the analyst provides a sufficient corpus of original 
statements against which to test the generalising hypothesis and acknowledges that 
that logic is not an entity existing in some space autonomous from those 
statements but a hypothesis drawn from that series of statements. 
Abandonment of the position outside the flux of events from whence one claims to 
discern the laws governing the practices and statements of others unwittingly 
emersed in that flux would bring about the ethnographer’s recognition that he or 
she shares a fundamental kinship with those observed. The anthropologist, like ‘the 
other’, discovers a place for his or her self within an unfolding series of events 
taking place before audiences which assess both those events and the 
ethnographer’s attempts to accommodate himself or herself to them. Like those he 
or she observes, the ethnographer comes to understand the ways the surrounding 
community makes the world heimlich by taking account of the reactions of that 
audience - the ‘significant other’ - to the way he or she responds to situations 
encountered. Such ‘reality testing’ enables the anthropologist to add to his or her 
repertoire of appropriate responses14. 
14
 Bruce Kapferer’s “Mind, Self and Other in Demonic Illness: the Negation and 
Reconstruction of Self” (Kapferer 1979) demonstrates the testing of self-
Anthropologists familiarizing themselves with host communities, like children being 
socialized or migrants or refugees learning to accommodate themselves to new 
milieus, differ from the communities with which they interact insofar as they are 
‘coming into culture’ from an outside. I have stressed that the anthropologist is not 
unlike the people he or she studies insofar as he or she shares with them the 
experience of continuously having to modify previous schemas of activity and 
interpretation to accord with circumstance and the reactions of others. Nonetheless, 
persons who are well accommodated to an environment will be used to performing 
the everyday adjustments of previous experiences to changed situations and will - 
except in encounters with radical anomalies or novelties - generally carry out that 
labour unselfconsciously. The anthropologist, like the other ‘outsiders’ mentioned, 
will be very aware of remodeling expectations and responses to fit with the new 
habitus he or she has come to inhabit; he or she, like them, does not unreflexively 
share a ‘common sense’ with the surrounding community. The experience of 
coming to terms with alterity through a reflexive process of altering characterizes 
the anthropologist’s experience. The anthropologist, not unlike other expatriates15, 
is distanced from familiar modes of thinking the real and has to familiarize his or 
her self with new ways of perceiving and responding to events. 
The act of moving, willingly or unwillingly, from one community’s habitus to 
constructs before the gaze of significant others in describing a Sri Lankan 
exorcism ritual in which a range of potential future identities are staged for 
the victim of possession before an audience made up of the local 
community.
15
 But unlike the child who, whilst similarly coming into a symbolic order from 
an outside, does not already possess another ‘language’ in terms of which it 
can gauge and self-reflexively articulate the process of transformation.
another’s does not, however, mechanically provide the traveller with ‘double vision’ 
- the ability to see one milieu in both the terms of its inhabitants and those of its 
other. Displacement is a highly charged emotional experience, and the expatriate 
may respond to it by denying, in a number of ways, the altering he or she has gone 
through. These denials include explict refusals to identify either with the host 
society (as with migrants or refugees who become even more nationalistic or 
religious than people remaining in the communities they left behind) or with their 
community of origin (as with fervent assimilationists who renounce any feeling for 
their previous place of residence). Such refusals are, of course, rejections of 
conscious and unconscious identifications with subject positions which, in the 
communities in which the refusers were raised, provided them with basic 
personality structures and which, in the milieus into which they have been adopted, 
allow them to communicate and act in the contexts of everyday life. Self imagings 
of dedicated revanchists, like those of rejectionists, are built upon foundations of 
disavowal. Ethnographers may, as well, engage in such disavowal in their responses 
to the communities in which they work, and the work of purification Latour 
describes, which retrospectively establishes an ontological divide between the 
ethnographer and the objects of his or her study, is an aspect of that denial. 
It is self reflexive attention to the process of altering which distinguishes the 
anthropological gaze from that of other displaced persons16. Coming to know how 
to act in a different cultural ambience involves the learner in recognizing situations 
as being somewhat ‘like’ others he or she has already encountered yet as 
16
 It is not, of course, only the trained anthropologist who is able to relay the 
experience of altering to audiences, as the proliferation of culturally 
insightful works - both fictional and non-fictional - by émigré writers 
demonstrates.
demanding responses unlike those the previous encounters had demanded. It is 
through awareness of this dialectical play of similarity and dissimilitude that the 
anthropologist develops the ability to translate the terms of one world-making 
process into those of another. Translation is akin to metaphor, as the etymological 
roots of the two terms suggests17, and the cultural translator ‘transfers’ to his or 
her audience the experience of transfer he or she has already been through. Honest 
translation, like nuanced mobilization of metaphor, always makes its audience 
aware of the substantial residue of dissimilarity which remains after similarity is 
conveyed. Similarly, the fieldwork encounter leaves the ethnographer (and, if he or 
she is honest in relating that encounter to an audience, the reader of his or her 
monograph) with the uncanny feeling that while things ‘there’ are sufficiently 
familiar to allow one to get on with the work of communication they are 
simultaneously different enough that the conceptions which provided the 
ethnographer with his or her initial foothold in the new space must be stretched 
and distorted if the ethnographer is to move in that space (or the reader is to 
vicariously position his or her self there). 
The anthropologist in the field is very much aware of the situation of moving 
between two worlds, and it is this Janus-faced awareness which allows him or her 
not only to grasp at an understanding of the field but also to formulate translations 
of that field experience for his or her readers at home. The ethnographer’s liminal 
positioning facilitates insights into both the culture studied and his or her originary 
culture. The term ‘liminal’ has, I would argue, been misused since Victor Turner 
17
 Both translation and metaphor derive from terms which, respectively in Latin 
and Greek, mean to transfer (translation from the Latin translatus, the past 
participle of transferre, and metaphor, from the Greek μεταφέιρειν)  (O.E.D. 
1971: 3381 and 1781). 
made Van Gennep’s limen into the foundation stone of the conceptual edifice he 
called liminality (Turner 1967). Although liminal, according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, means “of or pertaining to the threshold or initial stage of a 
process” (O.E.D. 1971: 1628), Turner extends both the word and its sense to 
liminality which, for him, is “the Nay to all positive structural assertions, but...in 
some sense the source of them all, and, more than that,...a realm of pure possibility 
whence novel configurations of ideas and relations may arise” (Turner 1967: 97)18. 
Liminal, in its literal sense, is not a state but a moment in a process, yet Turner 
freezes that process and inserts into the stilled interim a meta-cultural viewing 
platform which provides, for the Ndembu and other subjects whose cultures makes 
available such vantage points (Turner’s later work strove to prove that such points - 
whether ‘liminal’ or ‘liminoid’ - were available in all cultures), a site analogous to 
the position of the subject who knows. Turner’s invention of a transcendent 
position from whence viewers can gaze with detachment upon the particular forms 
their cultures forge out of pure possibility serves the same end as does Western 
epistemology’s siting of the subject who knows; both make it possible to imagine 
subjects who pre-exist the social contexts in which subjectivity is inevitably 
manifested. Both, in other words, are machineries for the production of ideological 
categories of the autonomous self19. However, the various ‘liminal’ positions from 
18
 Robin Horton has revealed the theological roots of Turner’s conceptions of 
sites of radical possibility in “Ritual Man in Africa” (Horton 1964: especially 
pp. 93-96).
19
  Turner, with his talk of “an uncommitted man, an individual rather than a 
social persona” (Turner 1967: 108), makes explicit the ontological 
separation of subjects from societies which he sees as “structure[s] of 
which the anthropologist looks back towards the social milieu from whence he or 
she came as well as into that into which he or she is moving are moments (each of 
them different, as Rabinow shows in Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco) in the 
midst of a dynamic process of remaking the self through taking into it images of 
identity provided by experiences within the community the anthropologist is 
joinging. The sites from whence the ethnographer gazes are not still and detached 
vantage points of autonomous intellection, but wayside stops where he or she, 
threatened with vertigo, pauses momentarily to take bearings by looking back 
towards the certitudes of an identity beginning to distort with distance and 
forwards towards another ambience which not only reveals different ways of being 
in the world but also, in demonstrating how to live with others, others the self.
Psychoanalysis’s most significant contribution to twentieth century thought is 
simultaneously its most systematically disavowed insight20. Sigmund Freud’s 
nuanced analyses of the relation of the infant to the structured world of family or 
carers which encompasses it demonstrate that self is not born but made. Freud 
shows that the human subject is constituted through identifications with subject 
positions” (Turner 1967: 93). Although his Christian humanism is apparently 
more generous than modernity’s epistemology insofar as he suggests that 
all humans can at times access sites which liberate from ideology (modernity 
restricts this access to the enlightened intellectual), Turner’s liberation is 
effectively millenarian in that the energies which are temporarily loosed are - 
in this world - always rechanneled into the work of social structuration (see 
Turner 1969).
20
 Anthropologists willing to use psychoanalytic structures or categories in 
their analyses of particular cultural traits (see, for examples, essays in Heald 
& Deluz 1994) seem unwilling to ally themselves with psychoanalysis’s more 
global conclusions about subjectivity and the social. 
positions manifested to it through the activities of others with whom it is brought 
into relation in the course of its development21. Identifications with others, other’s 
characteristics, or with the objects of others’s desires impel the child - and the 
adult that develops out of that child’s elaboration of a repertoire of identifications - 
to engage, unconsciously or consciously, in scenarios within which it plays out 
fantasies of intersubjective relations with significant others in its real or imagined 
environment. These fantasies more often present dilemmas than straight-forward 
mise en scènes of fulfillment, and in thinking through resolutions to these 
dilemmas human personalities develop. Thus, for instance, in going through the 
Oedipus Complex the male child sublimates desires which open it to the threat of 
what it perceives as castration and substitutes desexualized imagings of future 
relations with other persons for its scenarios of immediate corporeal relations with 
either the mother or the father22.  Identification is, for Freud, the primal movement 
21
 In psychoanalysis identification is used not in the sense of identifying, as 
when someone identifies an object or an act as being ‘the same as’ another 
or ‘in the same class or category as’ other objects or acts (‘A is the same as 
B’ or ‘A is a B’), but in the sense of ‘identification of onself with’ a person, a 
characteristic of a person, or (oftimes perversely) a thing (see Laplanche & 
Pontalis 1973: 205-208).
22
  See Freud’s “The Dissolution of the Oedipal Complex” (Freud 1961, original 
1924). Juliet Mitchell’s useful analysis of castration in her Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis (Mitchell 1974: 74- 100) emphasises the threat which impels 
the male child into substitutive fantasies of identification and points to 
Freud’s failure to provide an account of female identifications. The rôle of 
identification, and its implications for masculinity and feminity, are further 
explored by Elizabeth Cowie (Cowie 1997: esp. 72-122) and Slavoj Žižek 
of the infant out of the inarticulate sensorium of its body into the socially 
structured world of others. It is in repetitions of that process, through which the 
individual takes up new identifications and renounces or re-forms previous ones, 
that that developing person more or less successfully learns to negotiate the 
demands of others and to internalize from those demands what it comes to 
perceive as its own needs and desires. Jacques Lacan’s renowned elaborations of 
Freudian insights, most notably in his work developing his insights into the 
interplay of image and identification in ‘the mirror stage’ (Lacan 1977a; Lacan 
1977b), demonstrates that the self is constructed through identifications with 
others to the extent that, as Lacan phrases it, “I is an other” (Lacan 1977b: 23).
Freud’s above-cited essay demonstrating how negotiating the Oedipus Complex 
introduces the child into the series of compensatory identifications providing access 
to the social world of rôle-playing and language was published - through a 
synchronicity which disciplinary divides and antagonisms have in large part 
rendered invisible - in the same year Marcel Mauss presented “Real and Practical 
Relations between Psychology and Sociology” to the Société de Psychologie in Paris 
(Mauss 1924; Mauss 1979a). There Mauss assaulted, as it were ‘from the other 
side’, the same wall dividing the social and the psychological which Freud was 
intent on dismantling. In his address to psychologists he saw as committed to 
dividing “facts of the various biological and psychological orders from social 
facts” (Mauss 1979a: 9), Mauss asserted that 
"although we said that this essential part of sociology, collective psychology, is an 
essential part, we deny that it can be separated from the others and we will not say 
that it is only a matter of psychology, for this collective psychology or `sociological 
psychology' is more than that. And you yourselves have to fear its encroachments 
(Žižek 1989: 105-128). 
and its conclusions....[I]t is no longer sociology that is in question. By a curious 
reversal, it is psychology itself. The psychologists, while accepting our 
collaboration, could perhaps do well to defend themselves. Indeed, the contribution 
of collective representations: ideas, concepts, categories, motives for traditional 
actions and practices, collective sentiments and fixed expressions of the emotions 
and sentiments, is so great, even in the individual consciousness - and we make a 
very energetic claim to study it - that at times we seem to want to reserve for 
ourselves all investigations in these higher strata of the individual consciousness. 
Higher sentiments, mostly social: reason, personality, will to choose or freedom, 
practical habits, mental habits and character, variations in these habits; all this we 
claim as part of our province, along with many other things.... (Mauss 1979a: 9).
He continues by asserting that the proper domain of sociological analysis 
furthermore
“converge[s] with physiology, the phenomena of bodily life, for it seems that 
between the social and the bodily the layer of individual consciousness is very thin: 
laughter, tears, funerary laments, ritual ejaculations, are physiological reactions just 
as much as they are obligatory gestures and signs, sentiments that are obligatory or 
necessary or suggested or employed by collectivities to a precise end, with a view to 
a kind of physical and moral discharge of its expectations, which are physical and 
moral too" (Mauss 1979a: 10)23.
23
 Although Mauss continues - strategically I believe - by saying “[b]ut do not 
be afraid. We have an out-and-out respect for your frontiers, having a sense 
of justice, and it is enough that there be an element of individual 
consciousness, large or small, to legitimate the existence of an individual 
discipline devoted to it” (Mauss 1979a: 10), he concludes the presentation by 
stressing the necessity of the study of ‘the total man’ in which “the triple 
Mauss, with Durkheim, asserted that the social provided the forms through which 
psychological and physiological matter took shape and found expression (see 
Durkheim & Mauss 1903; Durkheim & Mauss 1963), and Mauss, in his assault on 
the autonomy of psychology, stressed that “cries and words, gestures and rites - 
for example of etiquette and morality - are signs and symbols. Fundamentally they 
are translations. Indeed the primary thing they translate is the presence of the 
group" (Mauss 1979a: 21). In a later essay, “Les Techniques du Corps” (Mauss 1935; 
Mauss 1979b), in which he introduced the concept of the habitus, Mauss elaborated 
what he called ‘prestigious imitation’ - the process through which individuals learn 
the social language in terms of which they subsequently move (as well as emote, 
think and express themselves): 
"What takes place is a prestigious imitation. The child, the adult, imitates actions 
which have/succeeded and which he has seen successfully performed by people in 
whom he has confidence and who have authority over him. The action is imposed 
from without, from above, even if it is an exclusively biological action involving his 
body. The individual borrows the series of movements which constitute it from the 
action executed in front of him or with him by others.  It is precisely this notion of 
the prestige of the person who performs the ordered, authorized, tested action vis-
à-vis the imitating individual that contains all the social element. The imitative 
action which follows contains the psychological element and the biological 
element” (Mauss 1979b: 101) . 
The process of prestigious imitation Mauss develops is analogous to that of 
identification elaborated by Freud and Lacan. In both instances an image endowed 
with an aura of power and success is drawn by the individual from the world of 
consideration of the body, the mind and the social environment must go 
together” (Mauss 1979a: 31). 
others which encompasses it and is internalized to serve as a model for that 
individual’s subsequent expressions. Such expressions need not be public; Freud’s 
studies of dreams and fantasies indicate that such interior experiences play out 
possible intersubjective relations while Vološinov argues that thought is itself a 
form of social discourse insofar as “there is no such thing as thinking outside 
orientation toward possible expression and, hence, outside the social orientation of 
that expression and of the thinking involved” (Vološinov 1973: 90). The self, in 
private as in public, performs itself through enacting and playing improvisations on 
the rôles it has learned through identifying with others.
Mauss’s work differs from Freud’s insofar as the former’s sociological focus led him 
to approach generalizations about the ‘total man’ through arguments about 
collective regularities whilst the latter’s attention to individual case studies meant 
that generalizations about psychological processes were most commonly made 
through observations of individual maladjustment and deviancy. As a result, Freud’s 
work attended more closely to processes of internalizing and interpretating the 
demands of the social order than did Mauss’s. Despite their respective valorizations 
of the psychological and the social, Freud and his more radical followers remained 
fully aware of the determinative power of the social over the individual’s psychic 
economy (as one can see, for instance, in Lacan’s stress on the force of the 
symbolic order) while Mauss and the members of the Année Sociologique were 
attentive to the ‘play’ particular histories of encounter introduced into the 
machinery of collective representation24. Mauss and Freud alike demonstrated that 
24
  See, for instance, Mauss’s study of Inuit social organization (Mauss 1979c), 
Durkheim’s work on suicide (Durkheim 1951), and, perhaps most strikingly, 
Hertz’s study of practices at the shrine of St. Besse (Hertz 1913; Hertz 
1983). 
the subject is not an autonomous entity standing outside the social processes 
within which it choses to engage but is a matrix of energies penetrated, shaped, 
and directed by social exteriority. Their common perspective is summed up in 
Michel Henry’s assertion that the subject “is nothing but representation itself, the 
pure fact of setting forth as the opening up of an Outside, an Outside that is the 
world as such” (Henry 1991: 159).
Anthropology can only escape the solipsism brought to the fore by its recent efforts 
to purge its practice of modernity’s cultural imperialism by reasserting and 
developing the insights Mauss and Freud elaborated in the early decades of this 
century. Those insights, which stressed that the subject was incapable of 
transcending the social matrices which gave it the materials of its consciousness, 
could not be accommodated within the epistemology which had informed Western 
thought since the fourth century. Mauss’s and Freud’s respective dismantlings of 
the wall dividing the subject from the context in which it comes into being rendered 
unviable the camera obscura allegedly occupied by the subject who knows, and as a 
result their works were systematically misread by the mainstreams of the disciplines 
they worked within so that that wall (and the ‘objectivity’ it protects) would continue 
to appear as unbreachable25.  It is, however, in fieldwork - which similarly 
developed its contemporary authority in the early part of this century through the 
25
 Just as mainstream psychoanalysis reasserted the primacy of the individual 
psyche over the social to an extent which made it necessary that the 
Lacanian tendency be outlawed, so too did subsequent anthropology and 
sociology turn away from the radical implications of the Année 
Sociologique’s inquiries into the social constitution of subjectivity. Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’s stimulating Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss (Lévi-
Strauss 1950; Lévi-Strauss 1987) intriguingly rechannels the radical 
constructivism underlying Mauss’s oeuvre into a mentalism which fully 
extends itself in structuralism. Favret-Saada intriguingly quotes Bertrand 
Poirot- Delpech to demonstrate that even the betes-noires of contemporary 
rationalism, the deconstructionists, insist that they speak from a place 
detached from the world of which they speak - “[a] total a-topia, an absolute 
nomadism: to talk from nowhere, to become ungraspable, unapproachable, 
irrecuperable in every way” (Poirot-Delpech, ‘Maîtres à dépenser’ in Le 
Monde, 30 April 1976, quoted in Favret-Saada 1980: 14, n. 2).
work of figures such as Branislaw Malinowski (whose Diary in the Strict Sense of the 
Term, [Malinowski 1967] was able, fifty years after it was written, to shock those 
who wanted to believe in the Olympian objectivity of the master) - that the 
anthropologist is forced to observe the way that he or she is infected with alterity in 
the course of seeking to understand it. Like every subject which enters into its own 
subjectivity by taking into itself figures and forms from the world which 
encompasses it, the subject which sees itself as an anthropologist is made over by 
internalizing - through prestigious imitation and identification - the ‘objects’ it 
studies. Traditions of ethnographic exegesis insist that that subject regain its 
objectivity by overlooking this experience of altering in the process of ‘writing up’, 
but an understanding of the ‘Them’ studied, as well as of the ‘Us’ who study, can 
only be achieved through a meticulous observation and recounting of the process 
of becoming a subject in and of the habitus observed. Such a ‘radical empiricism’ is 
autobiographical but it is an autobiography of a self which mutates into something 
other than what it was, and the narrative of that othering can open to its readers 






1. As Mark Cousins points out in a review of Lévi-Strauss’s Introduction to the Work 
of Marcel Mauss, recognizing an act of communication and comprehending the 
significance it carries are two distinct things:  “within twentieth-century 
anthropological commentaries the utterance of some Bororo who said to von 
Steinem, ‘We are red parakeets’, resounds with a raging subjective intensity of 
communication. The most foreign utterance is not only still one, it is perhaps pre-
eminently the one which communicates its subjective force. The problem is how to 
separate ourselves from it, so that we may know it, know what it signifies” (Cousins 
1989: 84).
2.  Asad contends that Ernest Gellner engages in cultural translation as “a matter of 
determining implicit meanings - not the meanings the native speaker actually 
acknowledges in his speech, not even the meanings the native listener necessarily 
accepts, but those he is ‘potentially capable of sharing’ with scientific authority ‘in 
some ideal situation’....The fact that in that ‘ideal situation’ he would no longer be a 
Berber tribesman but something coming to resemble Professor Gellner does not 
appear to worry such cultural translators” (Asad, 1986: 162).
3. Latour, as an historian of science, locates the advent of modernity in the early 
seventeenth century with the empiricist move to separate the domains of ideology 
and nature. In my above- mentioned paper I argued that the advent of modernity - 
as a movement to impose a universal ‘truth order’ on the matter of the world - can 
be located much earlier with the fourth century imperial legitimation of the 
missionary project of Christianity (Bowman 1996: 110-113).
 4. “the very notion of culture is an artifact created by bracketing nature off. 
Cultures - different or universal - do not exist, any more than Nature does. There 
are only natures-cultures....similar in that they simultaneously construct humans, 
divinities and nonhumans. None of them inhabits a world of signs or symbols 
arbitrarily imposed on an external Nature known to us alone. None of them - and 
especially not our own - lives in a world of things. All of them sort out what will 
bear signs and what will not. If there is one thing we all do, it is surely that we 
construct both our human collectives and the nonhumans that surround 
them” (Latour 1993: 104 and 106).
5. Interestingly, We Have Never Been Modern is marked by a profound ambivalence 
towards anthropology. Latour opens by posing anthropology as a totalising model 
fit to deconstruct the mythological divisions of the fields of ‘modern’ society (“in 
works produced by anthropologists abroad, you will not find a single trait that is 
not simultaneously real, social and narrated” [Latour 1993: 7]) but concludes by 
asserting that  “[a]nthropology had been built on the basis of science, or on the 
basis of society, or on the basis of language; it always alternated between 
universalism and cultural relativism, and in the end it may have taught us as little 
about ‘Them’ as about ‘Us’” (Latour 1993: 129). The clue to his ambivalence may lie 
in his assertion that “it is possible to do an anthropological analysis of the modern 
world - but then the very definition of the modern world has to be altered” (Latour 
1993: 7); an anthropology which draws its analytical categories from the ‘modern’ 
cannot - because of the epistemology which underwrites those categories - do 
more than reiterate the illusions which constitute modern society’s understanding 
of itself. 
6. It is indicative of what Latour calls anthropology’s failure to have taught us any 
more about ourselves than about others that reflexive anthropology’s inability to 
escape the subject positions of western autobiography is mirrored by mainstream 
anthropology’s continued enmirement in the ideological category of the self as the 
locus of anthropological inquiry - a position recently celebrated in the work of 
Anthony Cohen (Cohen 1994). 
7. “[I]n ethnographic writings neither the speaker nor his partner - in other words, 
neither the stating subject, author of the scientific report, nor his reader - are 
defined. It is implied that the ‘I’ need not introduce himself because he is taken for 
granted, just like the ‘you’ who is talked to. It is so much a matter of course that 
the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ converse about ‘him’, that the stating subject can withdraw 
behind an indefinite subject, and call himself ‘one’” (Favret-Saada 1980: 27).
8. As Rabinow points out, the informant, in developing a vocabulary through which 
he or she can communicate with the fieldworker, is also displaced from the life 
world he or she occupied prior to the necessity of communicating that world to the 
anthropologist (Rabinow, 1977: 152 and 162f on Driss ben Mohammed).
9.  My insistence, throughout this text, on using the clumsy pronominal ‘he or she’ 
and ‘his or her’ instead of the more familiar ‘he’ or ‘his’ is itself an intentional 
mobilization of ostranenie meant to force the reader to reflect on the cultural 
practice of eliding the feminine when producing a ‘universal’ subject position which 
is in fact masculine. 
10. What comes to mind as I attempt to formulate how ostranenie might function in 
reading ethnography is my own experience, twenty years ago, of feeling an 
extended sense of cognitive dissonance on finishing Larry Niven’s science fiction 
novel Ring World (Niven 1972) as I ‘slid back’ from a reality in which lives I had 
imaginatively participated in were lived on great terra- formed hoops circling their 
sun to one in which people lived on orbiting ovoid rock formations.
11. Rabinow’s observations here lead one to query whether anthropologists’s rôle 
in enabling peoples to ‘rediscover’ their traditions may in fact be that of facilitating 
what Hobsbawm and Ranger have called ‘the invention of tradition’ (Hobsbawm & 
Ranger 1983).
12.  In “A Country of Words” I have discussed the way the term ‘Palestine’ 
constitutes a transnational community which tends to disintegrate when its 
constituencies articulate different perceptions about what being ‘Palestinian’ means 
and demands (Bowman 1994).
13. Favret-Saada notes that “I made it a rule to write...about the native discourse 
including silences, slips of the tongue, repetitions, hesitations and so on” (Favret-
Saada, 1980: 150, note 2).
14. Bruce Kapferer’s “Mind, Self and Other in Demonic Illness: the Negation and 
Reconstruction of Self” (Kapferer 1979) demonstrates the testing of self-constructs 
before the gaze of significant others in describing a Sri Lankan exorcism ritual in 
which a range of potential future identities are staged for the victim of possession 
before an audience made up of the local community.
15. But unlike the child who, whilst similarly coming into a symbolic order from an 
outside, does not already possess another ‘language’ in terms of which it can gauge 
and self-reflexively articulate the process of transformation.
16. It is not, of course, only the trained anthropologist who is able to relay the 
experience of altering to audiences, as the proliferation of culturally insightful 
works - both fictional and non- fictional - by émigré writers demonstrates.
17. Both translation and metaphor derive from terms which, respectively in Latin 
and Greek, mean to transfer (translation from the Latin translatus, the past 
participle of transferre, and metaphor, from the Greek μεταφέιρειν)  (O.E.D. 1971: 
3381 and 1781). 
18. Robin Horton has revealed the theological roots of Turner’s conceptions of sites 
of radical possibility in “Ritual Man in Africa” (Horton 1964: especially pp. 93-96).
19.  Turner, with his talk of “an uncommitted man, an individual rather than a social 
persona” (Turner 1967: 108), makes explicit the ontological separation of subjects 
from societies which he sees as “structure[s] of positions” (Turner 1967: 93). 
Although his Christian humanism is apparently more generous than modernity’s 
epistemology insofar as he suggests that all humans can at times access sites which 
liberate from ideology (modernity restricts this access to the enlightened 
intellectual), Turner’s liberation is effectively millenarian in that the energies which 
are temporarily loosed are - in this world - always rechanneled into the work of 
social structuration (see Turner 1969).
20. Anthropologists willing to use psychoanalytic structures or categories in their 
analyses of particular cultural traits (see, for examples, essays in Heald & Deluz 
1994) seem unwilling to ally themselves with psychoanalysis’s more global 
conclusions about subjectivity and the social. 
21. In psychoanalysis identification is used not in the sense of identifying, as when 
someone identifies an object or an act as being ‘the same as’ another or ‘in the 
same class or category as’ other objects or acts (‘A is the same as B’ or ‘A is a B’), 
but in the sense of ‘identification of onself with’ a person, a characteristic of a 
person, or (oftimes perversely) a thing (see Laplanche & Pontalis 1973: 205-208).
22.  See Freud’s “The Dissolution of the Oedipal Complex” (Freud 1961, original 
1924). Juliet Mitchell’s useful analysis of castration in her Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis (Mitchell 1974: 74-100) emphasises the threat which impels the 
male child into substitutive fantasies of identification and points to Freud’s failure 
to provide an account of female identifications. The rôle of identification, and its 
implications for masculinity and feminity, are further explored by Elizabeth Cowie 
(Cowie 1997: esp. 72-122) and Slavoj Žižek (Žižek 1989: 105-128). 
23. Although Mauss continues - strategically I believe - by saying “[b]ut do not be 
afraid. We have an out-and-out respect for your frontiers, having a sense of justice, 
and it is enough that there be an element of individual consciousness, large or 
small, to legitimate the existence of an individual discipline devoted to it” (Mauss 
1979a: 10), he concludes the presentation by stressing the necessity of the study of 
‘the total man’ in which “the triple consideration of the body, the mind and the 
social environment must go together” (Mauss 1979a: 31). 
24.  See, for instance, Mauss’s study of Inuit social organization (Mauss 1979c), 
Durkheim’s work on suicide (Durkheim 1951), and, perhaps most strikingly, Hertz’s 
study of practices at the shrine of St. Besse (Hertz 1913; Hertz 1983). 
25. Just as mainstream psychoanalysis reasserted the primacy of the individual 
psyche over the social to an extent which made it necessary that the Lacanian 
tendency be outlawed, so too did subsequent anthropology and sociology turn away 
from the radical implications of the Année Sociologique’s inquiries into the social 
constitution of subjectivity. Claude Lévi-Strauss’s stimulating Introduction to the 
Work of Marcel Mauss (Lévi-Strauss 1950; Lévi-Strauss 1987) intriguingly 
rechannels the radical constructivism underlying Mauss’s oeuvre into a mentalism 
which fully extends itself in structuralism. Favret-Saada intriguingly quotes Bertrand 
Poirot- Delpech to demonstrate that even the betes-noires of contemporary 
rationalism, the deconstructionists, insist that they speak from a place detached 
from the world of which they speak - “[a] total a-topia, an absolute nomadism: to 
talk from nowhere, to become ungraspable, unapproachable, irrecuperable in every 
way” (Poirot-Delpech, ‘Maîtres à dépenser’ in Le Monde, 30 April 1976, quoted in 
Favret-Saada 1980: 14, n. 2).
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